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Parliamentary Reform
La réforme du Parlement
Philip Norton
1 The British Parliament constitutes what Michael Mezey has characterised as a reactive, or
what I have termed a policy-influencing, legislature.1 Policy is formulated and proposed
by the executive. Parliament discusses the policy and gives (or withholds) its assent to it.
This  relationship  of  Parliament  to  the  executive  is  historically  well  entrenched.
Originally, it was the monarch who was the fount of public policy, now it is the body of
the monarch’s principal ministers meeting in Cabinet. The basic relationship has not been
a matter of fundamental dispute in recent decades. What has been a matter of dispute is
the extent  to which Parliament,  in responding to the executive,  could influence and
constrain it. Jean Blondel coined the term ‘viscosity’ to refer to a legislature’s capacity to
slow the stream of  executive  actions  and proposals.2 Critics  have variously  regarded
Parliament in the UK as having a low viscosity, both in absolute terms and relative to
many West European legislatures. 
2 Demands for reform have generally focused on strengthening the viscosity of Parliament.
They have rarely been aimed at changing fundamentally the relationship between the
executive and legislature,  that is,  in terms of creating a policy-making rather than a
policy-influencing legislature. Occasionally a writer advocates a system of separation of
powers but such advocacy is exceptional. Most critics offer prescriptions for a stronger
policy-influencing legislature. 
3 Calls  for  parliamentary  reform can be  seen in  cyclical  terms.  Perceptions  of  a  weak
Parliament, especially in the face of an ever more powerful executive, build up. There are
demands  for  reform.  The  government  resists  these  demands  but  eventually  some
concession  is  made  and  various  changes  occur  in  parliamentary  structures  and
procedure.  There is  then a period of  consolidation (some might say of  complacency)
before perceptions of Parliament still being weak in relation to a powerful executive build
up and demands for reform follow. 
4 There was a build up of demands for reform in the 1960s, resulting in various changes – to
committees and procedures – under the Labour Leader of the House of Commons, Richard
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Crossman. The reforms themselves had a limited effect and demands for change were
renewed in the 1970s. They resulted in the most significant change of the past fifty years
with the introduction, in 1979, of a series of investigative select committees to cover most
(since extended to all) government departments. They were introduced at the beginning
of a new Parliament under the Conservative Leader of the House, Norman St.John-Stevas.
Various other changes were also made in that Parliament. Dissatisfaction built up again,
especially in the 1990s. The incoming Labour Government in 1997, under Prime Minister
Tony  Blair,  was  committed  to  some  reform  of  Parliament.  Some  changes  were
implemented but, as we shall see, they were limited. They failed to satisfy the demands of
those seeking to strengthen Parliament as a policy-influencing legislature.
5 The calls for reform can themselves be grouped now under two headings. There are those
seeking reform of Parliament through change external to the institution. Advocates of
such reform believe that Parliament will only be able to play a significant role in the
political process if there is constitutional reform. They support, in particular, the
introduction of  a new electoral  system to prevent the likelihood of  the election of  a
single-party majority government. Calls for a new electoral system were made in the
1970s but have been more vocal and more strident in recent years. The Liberal Democrats
are long-standing supporters of electoral reform. The Labour Party in the 1990s was also
more sympathetic  than before to reform.  In its  election manifesto in 1997 the party
proposed establishing a commission and then holding a referendum on the subject. An
Independent Commission on the Voting System, set up in 1997 by the Prime Minister,
reported in 1998 and recommended a new, and novel, electoral system (the Alternative
Vote Plus)  for  parliamentary  elections.  However,  no  action  was  taken  on  the
Commission’s  report  in  the  Parliament  and  the  Labour  Party  manifesto  in  the  2001
general election committed the party only to a review of the report. 
6 There are also demands for reform internal to the institution. These have been at the
heart  of  demands  for  parliamentary  reform  over  the  decades  and  generally  bring
together a wider range of supporters than demands for external reform. (The two are not
mutually exclusive, with some advocating both external and internal reform, but not all
those favouring internal reform support external reform.) The calls for internal reform
include the creation and strengthening of committees, the overhaul of the process for
scrutinising legislation, changes in procedures for holding debates and Question Time,
new methods of appointing members to committees, and more extensive resources for
members. 
7 The demands for reform outlined so far have focused on the elected chamber, the House
of  Commons.  There have also been demands for  reform of  the second chamber,  the
unelected House of Lords. These can also be characterised under the headings of external
and internal reform. External reform takes the form of statutory change designed to
transform  the  chamber  in  terms  of  composition  and/or  powers.  Internal  reform  is
designed to enable the House to use more effectively the powers that it already has. The
House of Lords is a self-regulating body – there is no presiding officer exercising any
independent  powers –  and  has  proved  more  willing  than  the  House  of  Commons  to
engage in reflective study of its own practices and procedures and to modify them from
time to time.  Such changes have not been the focus of  public  pressure or attention.
Instead, most debate about the Upper House has concentrated, almost exclusively, on
composition and the place of the House in the political process.
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8 This brief prologue sets the scene for an analysis of reform under the Labour Government
elected in 1997. I address five questions about reform of the House of Commons. First,
why the need for reform? Second, what reform has been implemented under the Labour
Government of Tony Blair? Third, why has the reform not been more extensive? Fourth,
what reform proposals are presently on the agenda? And, finally, what are the prospects
of further reform being achieved? I address similar questions, but – for reasons of space –
in a shorter section, for the House of Lords.
 
Why the Need for Reform?
9 In the view of many commentators, the House of Commons is a relatively weak policy-
influencing legislature and one that is getting weaker. Why? In July 2000, the Commission
to Strengthen Parliament published its report, Strengthening Parliament.3 The Commission
was established in July 1999 by the Leader of the Opposition, William Hague, “to examine
the causes of the decline in the effectiveness of Parliament in holding the executive to account, and
to make proposals  for strengthening democratic control  over the Government”. I  chaired the
Commission and it took evidence from informed witnesses drawn from several political
parties and from none. I focus here on its analysis of ‘decline’.
10 Decline denotes a fall from some higher point. The Commission rejected the notion that
there had been a ‘golden age’ of Parliament. Nonetheless, it did accept that there had
been several developments, often independent of one another and occurring at different
times, which had served to weaken Parliament in challenging the executive. It identified
three  long-term  developments  and  a  number  of  more  recent  ones.  The  long-term
developments were:
• the  growth  of  party,  ensuring  an  aggregation  of  views,  the  growth  of  party  loyalty  and
cohesion (both outside and inside Parliament), and normally providing the government with
a party majority to carry its measures;
• the growth of government business, both in quantity (the volume of legislation) and quality (the
complexity  of  legislation),  creating  a  massive  burden  of  business  to  be  transacted  by
Parliament; and
• the growth of organised interests, with information and sanctions (withdrawal of co-operation)
at  their  disposal,  both  of  which  a  party-dominated  House  of  Commons  lacked  or  was
unwilling to employ.
11 These have been compounded by more recent developments:
• partisanship, creating a sharp clash between parties and a greater negativism in debate;
• the  rise  of  the  career  politician,  creating  an  increase  in  consumption  of  parliamentary
resources and squeezing out of the institution people with experience of sectors other than
politics;
• concentration of power in Downing Street, with the Prime Minister becoming more ‘presidential’
and hence detached from his own party and government as well as from Parliament;
• constitutional change, with law-making powers being passed to other institutions, such as the
institutions of the European Union and elected assemblies in different parts of the UK;
• the  media  revolution,  with  24-hours  news  and  a  government  capacity  to  exploit  the
developments that cannot be matched by Parliament; and
• de-politicisation with some elements in society opting for direct action rather than debate
and also with some issues being hived off to non-elected bodies.
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12 There are two essential points arising from the Commission’s analysis. First, there is no
single development that accounts for the limited viscosity of the House of Commons.
Second, these developments are, in many cases, irreversible. Consequently, if Parliament
is to be strengthened in calling the executive to account, one has to look beyond the
developments themselves.
 
What Reform has been Implemented?
13 The Labour Party manifesto for the 1997 general election said that “the House of Commons
is in need of modernisation” and promised that a Labour government would ask the House of
Commons to set  up a special  committee to review its  procedures.  It  went on:  “Prime
Minister’s Questions will be made more effective. Ministerial accountability will be reviewed so as
to remove abuses. The process for scrutinising European legislation will be overhauled”.4
14 As soon as Labour took office, the new Prime Minister, Tony Blair, decided to answer
questions during one thirty-minute slot each week in the House of Commons rather than
two fifteen-minute  slots.  The  House  of  Commons  agreed  to  the  creation  of  a  Select
Committee on the Modernisation of the House of Commons. As is usual with committees,
the membership reflected proportionately the party composition of the House as a whole:
unusually,  though,  it  was chaired by a minister (the Leader of  the House) and not a
backbencher. It was given the task “to consider how the practices and procedures of the House
should be modernised, and to make recommendations thereon.” It was asked to make its first
report on ways in which “the procedure for examining legislation could be improved” and to do
so before the summer recess. Seven weeks after it was appointed, it published its report,
entitled The Legislative Process.5 
15 The  report  proposed  a  wide  range  of  reforms,  mostly  to  be  undertaken  on  an
experimental basis. These included programming the passage of legislation (stipulating
the times at which particular stages had to be completed), greater pre-legislative scrutiny
and consultation, and provision for some bills to carry over from one parliamentary year
to  another.  The  report  was  approved  by  the  House  of  Commons  and several  of  the
recommendations  put  into  effect.  Programming motions  were  introduced for  bills,  a
number of bills were published in draft form and one major bill was carried over from
one session to another.
16 The Select Committee on Modernisation went on to publish reports on a wide range of
issues. By the end of the Parliament, it had published seventeen reports. Of these, eight
were published in the first  parliamentary session (1997-98)  of  its  existence.  It  issued
reports on such matters as the scrutiny of  European legislation,  voting methods,  the
creation of  a  ‘parallel  chamber’,  facilities  for  the  media,  and the  timing  of  votes.  A
number  of  its  recommendations  were  implemented.  Provision  for  the  scrutiny  of
European legislation was extended: the second and third pillars of the European Union
were brought within the ambit of scrutiny. A new parallel chamber was created, with
sittings (open to all MPs) being held in the Grand Committee Room, just off Westminster
Hall and known formally as ‘sittings in Westminster Hall’. Sittings in Westminster Hall
enabled Members to raise issues of concern to them, but with no provision for votes to
take place. Some improvements were made in facilities for the media, including more
space to carry out televised interviews. There was also a change in voting procedure, with
certain specified topics debated late at night being voted on by paper ballot (a novel
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departure  for  the  House)  on  a  Wednesday  afternoon.  The  Committee  also  explored
whether voting should also take place electronically, but most Members preferred to stick
with the existing practice of voting physically in a division lobby.
17 By the end of the Parliament in 2001, the House of Commons was operating under a
number of  new procedures.  Some had strengthened the House in its  capacity to call
government to account. When the House of Commons debated parliamentary reform in
July 2000, Tony Blair said: “We have taken major steps… to improve the ways in which the House
can work.”6 Critics, however, took a different view, arguing that some reforms favoured
government in getting its business (notably programming and holding over some votes
until  Wednesday afternoon)  and that  the government had failed to implement other
reforms  that  had  been  proposed  to  strengthen  the  House  of  Commons.  The  Liaison
Committee  of  the  House,  comprising  the  chairmen  of  select  committees,  had
recommended changes designed to make committee service more attractive to MPs. The
government rejected the committee’s recommendations, even though the committee had
a  majority  of  government  supporters  sitting  on  it.  The  committee  criticised  the
government’s stance. The opposition, perhaps not surprisingly, attacked the government
for neglecting Parliament. So too did various parliamentary experts and journalists. “The
Blair  government”,  wrote  Peter  Riddell,  the  respected  columnist  for  The  Times,  “has
neglected Parliament”.7
 
Why has Reform not been more Extensive?
18 The period since 1997 has thus seen changes to procedures in the House of Commons.
However,  they  are  best  described  as  modest  changes.  Little  has  happened  that  has
significantly  strengthened  the  capacity  of  the  House  of  Commons  to  constrain  the
executive. Why, then, has reform not been more extensive?
19 One explanation is intrinsic to a parliamentary system of government, especially one that
normally  has  single-party  majority  government.  Members  of  the  majority  party  are
returned as party members and, as such, wish to sustain their party in government. At
the same time, as Members of Parliament, they are members of a body that is expected to
subject that very same government to critical scrutiny. There is thus a potential conflict
between loyalty to party and loyalty to the institution to which they have been elected.
Self-interest normally determines that party wins in any such conflict. Pursuit of short-
term party interest, as exemplified by intense partisanship in the chamber, can be at the
expense of public confidence in the House of Commons. The relevance of this for our
purposes  is  that  if  the  government  wishes  to  resist  reform,  its  supporters  may  be
reluctant to oppose it. Party loyalty and ambition for office are powerful weapons in the
hands of the government.
20 There  are  also  features  that  have  been  particular  to  the  Blair  government.  I  have
identified four, which I have characterised as uncertainty of purpose, the government’s
need to get its business, the absence of leadership, and commitment to constitutional
change.8
21 Uncertainty of purpose. Reform of parliamentary structures and procedures can be carried
out for a number of reasons. It may be carried out in order to expedite the passage of
government business. It may be carried out for the convenience of Members, making
parliamentary  life  less  burdensome.  It  may  be  implemented  for  largely  cosmetic
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purposes, removing practices that are difficult for members of the public (and sometimes
Members)  to understand.  It  may be carried out to enable Members to scrutinise and
constrain government more effectively. A case may be made for each of these, but it is
helpful to know the motivation of those bringing forward reform proposals. The problem
with the reforms of the Blair government is that they have had no clear focus. They have
been carried out as part of the government’s process of ‘modernisation’,  a term that
covers everything and consequently means nothing. Some changes have been made for
the  convenience  of  Members  (such  as  creating,  in  effect,  a  three-day  parliamentary
week). Some have been to the benefit of government, notably programming (ensuring
government gets its business, with some very tight timetables imposed) and the carry-
over  of  some  votes  to  Wednesdays.  Some  have  been  for  the  purpose  of  tidying  up
procedure that is difficult for the public to understand (such as the requirement to wear a
hat when raising a point of  order during a vote)  and some have been to strengthen
Parliament  in  calling  government  to  account.  Strengthening  the  House  in  calling
government to account has not been the exclusive or even primary focus.
22 The government’s need to get its business. Any government wants to get its business through
the  House  of  Commons.  Some  governments  are  keen  to  get  it  passed  as  quickly  as
possible.  The Blair government was a new government. It  had a legislative agenda it
wished to implement. Tony Blair appointed as Chief Whip a man who had a reputation for
firmness  and  who  was  committed  to  ensuring  the  government  got  its  way.  The
government’s need to get its business took precedence over any desire to strengthen the
House of Commons in challenging what the government was doing. This was also the
attitude taken by the person who, for most of the Parliament, was Leader of the House of
Commons, Margaret Beckett. She resisted attempts to strengthen select committees and
took  what  is  best  characterised  as  an  executive-oriented  approach.  It  was  not  an
approach that  endeared  her  to  members  of  the  Liaison Committee,  who gave  her  a
particularly difficult time when they summoned her to give evidence, but it was one that
appeared to chime with her boss, the Prime Minister. 
23 Absence of  leadership.  If  major reform is to be achieved,  there not only needs to be a
coherent proposal for change there also needs to be leadership in order to bring it about.
There was no such leadership under Tony Blair. Blair had little interest in the House of
Commons. He spent little time there. The time devoted to the House by Prime Ministers
has been declining for well over a hundred years.9 Blair spent less time there than his
predecessors. Though turning up regularly for Prime Minister’s Question Time, he rarely
took part in any debates and he had a notably poor voting record,  the worst of  any
modern Prime Minister.10 He did not appear to regard Parliament as central to the task of
government  and he expected his  MPs  to  be  loyal  to  the  government  in  whatever  it
decided to do. When the House debated parliamentary reform in July 2000, he attacked
the Leader of the Opposition for choosing it as a topic of debate. “I do not know”, he said,
“whether people in his pubs and clubs are talking about pre-legislative scrutiny, but they are not in
mine.”11 There  were  clearly,  in  his  opinion,  more  important  matters,  including  “big
constitutional questions”. Reform of the House of Commons did not appear to come within
the ambit of big constitutional questions.
24 Commitment  to  constitutional  reform.  The  Labour  government  was  committed  to  major
constitutional change. It implemented legislation creating elected assemblies in Scotland,
Wales  and  Northern  Ireland,  and  it  introduced  an  elected  mayor  for  London.  These
changes received popular approval in referendums. It removed most hereditary peers
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from membership of the second chamber. It achieved passage of the Human Rights Act,
incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights into British law. It achieved
passage of  a  Freedom of  Information Act.  The constitutional  landscape thus changed
quite dramatically. These changes had two implications for the House of Commons. First,
they meant that reform of the House of Commons was seen as of limited importance
compared to  the bigger  changes  being enacted.  Second,  the changes  themselves  had
implications  for  Parliament.  A  whole  sphere  of  decision-making  was  devolved  from
Parliament  to  elected assemblies  in different  parts of  the UK.  The enactment  of  the
Human Rights Act strengthened the courts in relation to Parliament. Parliament thus
faced  a  challenge  in  adapting  to  these  changes  as  well  as  considering  how it  could
strengthen itself in calling government to account. The pressure to act appeared greater
than its capacity to respond.
25 These  variables,  in  combination,  explain  why the  House  of  Commons  received  more
criticism for its failure to reform than it did praise for what change was implemented.
Though there were some changes, they failed to keep pace with the pressures that were
resulting in the further marginalisation of the House of Commons. 
 
What Reform Proposals are on the Agenda?
26 Recognising  that  Parliament  has  been  further  marginalised  in  the  political  process,
various bodies have published proposals for strengthening the House of Commons. These
have included parliamentary bodies, notably the Liaison Committee. In March 2000, it
published a report, Shifting the Balance: Select Committees and the Executive, arguing that
committees should be strengthened, not least through creating a career structure as an
alternative to ministerial office.12 As we have noted already, the Leader of the Opposition,
William  Hague,  set  up  a  Commission to  Strengthen  Parliament  in  1999,  with the
Commission reporting the following year. It made nearly ninety recommendations for
change .13 These included strengthening the chamber as a debating arena, strengthening
select committees (paying chairmen, taking selection of members out of the hands of the
parties), reforming standing committees dealing with legislation, improving scrutiny of
financial legislation (including allowing select committees to recommend changes in the
estimates) as well as of secondary and European legislation. It also wanted to strengthen
the resources available to Members individually as well as provide training for them. It
recommended making the House more accessible, both to the citizen and to the media. It
also favoured constraining government, recommending fewer ministers, fixed dates for
parliamentary sittings, and the Prime Minister appearing regularly before a committee.
The report received favourable press comment. It was debated in the House of Commons
on 13 July 2000 and in the House of Lords on 14 February 2001.
27 The report of the Commission to Strengthen Parliament was followed by a report from
another  commission.  In  1999,  the  Hansard  Society  (a  charitable  body  dedicated  to
promoting  the  cause  of  parliamentary  government)  appointed  a  Commission  on
Parliamentary Scrutiny. (The Society had, almost a decade before, established one on the
legislative  process,  which  published  a  substantial  report  on  the  subject.)14 The
Commission, under the chairmanship of a former Leader of the House of Commons, Tony
Newton (Lord Newton of Braintree), sat for two years and published its report in June
2001,  just  after  the  general  election.  Entitled  The  Challenge  for  Parliament:  Making
Government Accountable, the report contained almost fifty recommendations for change.15
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It,  too,  favoured  strengthening  select  committees,  with  committees  having  clear
objectives and the power to appoint sub-committees,  and with a closer link between
committees  and  the  floor  of  the  House.  It  also  wanted  to  see  a  strengthening  of
parliamentary scrutiny of finance and better communication with the public.
28 The proposals  from these bodies  tend to complement rather than compete with one
another.  There  is  a  clear  desire  to  strengthen the  role  of  select  committees  and  to
enhance the role of the chamber. For reform to be effective there has to be a window of
opportunity, a reform agenda, and leadership. There is clearly a reform agenda. 
 
What are the Prospects for the Futher Reform?
29 The limitations  of  implementing  a  reform agenda have  been well  recognised by  the
Hansard Society Commission. It wrote, in one of its concluding paragraphs:
The Commission is well aware that parliamentary reform has traditionally been a
slow process. The success of reforms often relies on balancing the aspirations and
objectives of MPs and ministers, frontbenchers and backbenchers, Government and
Opposition.  Reform  should,  as  far  as  possible,  seek  to  meet  the  needs  of  these
different groups. However, it has often been the case that the perceived difficulties
of  reform  have  prevented  a  creative  and  long-term  approach  to  the  role  of
Parliament.  This  has,  in  turn,  lengthened  the  time  it  has  taken  to  implement
change.16
30 Is it likely to remain a slow process? A Labour government has been re-elected to office
with a clear priority to implement reform of the public services. Parliamentary reform
hardly figures in its agenda. In its manifesto for the 2001 general election, it committed
itself to legislation to allow parties to make positive moves to increase the representation
of women in Parliament. In addition, “Labour will continue to modernise the procedures of the
House of Commons so it can effectively fulfil its functions of representation and scrutiny.”17 That
was the extent of the commitment. There was no mention of what ‘modernisation’ would
involve in terms of  specific  changes.  The party continues to be led by an executive-
oriented Prime Minister who appears to have little time for the House of Commons. The
Prime  Minister  heads  a  government  with  a  large  overall  majority  in  the  House  of
Commons. Even if a large number of Labour MPs disagrees with what the government is
doing (or not doing), the government is still likely to emerge victorious in any vote.
31 The only change that has taken place that gives reformers some hope is the fact that
there is a new Leader of the House of Commons. Former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook
was appointed, following the general election, to replace Margaret Beckett. As Foreign
Secretary, Cook was notably executive-oriented and clashed with the Select Committee
on Foreign Affairs. His background, on the face of it, is not encouraging. However, his
appointment as Leader of the House was widely seen as a demotion. There is therefore a
belief among some commentators, and among parliamentary insiders, that he may wish
to make a political mark by building a reputation as a reforming Leader of the House,
rather than one who leaves no notable legacy. 
32 Robin Cook’s words since taking up his new position have tended to be encouraging.
Speaking in the House of Commons on 27 June 2001, he said: 
I hope that we will be able to build consensus on modernisation of the Commons. As
Leader  of  the  House,  I  shall  seek  support  in  all  quarters  for  two  important
objectives  to  modernisation.  The  first  is  to  enable  the  House  to  hold  the
Government to account and to scrutinise their Executive decisions and legislation.18
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33 The second objective was to get select committees appointed before the House rose for
the summer recess. It had been assumed that the appointment was likely to be delayed
until the Autumn. Cook announced that he planned to get them appointed in the week
commencing 16 July. Also giving reformers hope of action was the fact that the junior
minister appointed to support Cook was an MP who was a supporter of reform (Stephen
Twigg). Cook appointed as his special adviser Greg Power, who had served as secretary to
the Hansard Society Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny.  Cook was also known to
favour extending the process of consultation on bills, bringing in people with expertise
from outside to offer their opinions. 
34 Such encouraging signs were off-set by the fact that Cook moved motions to change the
Standing Orders of the House, providing for the timetabling of legislation. The revised
Standing Orders were not seen by the Opposition as overly generous. It was also feared
that, even if Cook did bring forward proposals for major reform of the House in order to
enable it to question and scrutinise government more effectively, he would likely face
difficulties in Cabinet. Reformers thus looked to the new Leader of the House to deliver
reform, but it was not clear that, even if he wanted to, he would be able to. 
 
The House of Lords
35 The House of Commons is the elected, and thus the pre-eminent, chamber in Parliament.
It pre-eminence is recognised in statute and also in constitutional convention: the House
of Lords does not normally vote on the second reading (that is, on the principle) of a bill
that was promised in the government’s programme. By statute, it can only delay a Bill for
one parliamentary session (that is, a year). The House is a non-elected chamber, hence its
political  subordination to  the  first.  For  most  of  its  history,  it  has  comprised  mostly
hereditary peers (plus some senior churchmen). Two major reforms in recent decades
have transformed the composition of the House. The first of these was the Peerages Act
1958 which made provision for life peers to be created, the title dying out once the holder
died.  This made it  possible to bring into the House of  Lords people who objected to
hereditary  peerages  (and  hence  would  not  accept  such  peerages)  as  well  as  making
possible the creation of more members without adding to the numbers in the long term.
When a life  peer  died,  the membership of  the House was reduced by one.  When an
hereditary peer died, there was usually no effect on the number of members, as the peer
was succeeded as a member by his heir. The effect of life peerages was to bring in to the
House more active members.  The average attendance rose decade by decade and the
House became a more active House, utilising more than before committees to carry out
some of its work.
36 The second major reform came with the election of a Labour government in 1997. The
Labour Party was opposed to the retention of hereditary peers in the second chamber.
Some  favoured  an  elected  second  chamber.  Some  actually  preferred  a  unicameral
legislature. However, the party moved from favouring abolition to supporting a second
chamber but with the hereditary peers removed from membership. In its 1997 manifesto,
it declared that, “as an initial, self-contained reform, not dependent on further reform in the
future, the right of hereditary peers to sit and vote in the House of Lords will be ended by statute”.
That, it said, would be the first stage in a process of reform to make the House of Lords
“more democratic and representative”. A committee of both Houses would then be appointed
Parliamentary Reform
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XI-3 | 2002
9
to  undertake “a  wide-ranging  review of  possible  further  change  and then to  bring  forward
proposals for reform”.
37 The government anticipated problems in getting the Bill through the House of Lords.
Though the government knew it could ultimately get its way, it also knew that the Lords
could  cause  problems during the  passage  of  the  Bill  and,  indeed,  cause  problems in
dealing with other government Bills. The government therefore delayed introducing the
Bill until the second session (1998-99) of the Parliament. It also agreed a deal with the
Leader of the Conservative peers, Lord Cranborne, under which 92 hereditary peers (out
of  approximately  750)  remained  members  of  the  House  in  return  for  the  relatively
smooth passage of the Bill. The deal was kept to by both sides and the Bill was enacted.
When the House of  Lords met for the new session in November 1999,  it  was a body
reduced from a membership of just over 1,200 (the majority of them hereditary peers) to
one of 666 (the majority of them life peers). Most members could thus claim to be there
because of  the recognition of  their  particular  merits  rather than the merits  of  their
ancestors.
38 The  House  of  Lords  Act  constituted  the  first  stage  of  the  government’s  two-stage
approach to reform. However, the government was criticised for not saying what its plans
were for the second stage. In response to this criticism, the government decided early in
1999  to  appoint  a  Royal  Commission on the  Reform of  the  House  of  Lords  to  make
recommendations for stage two. The Royal Commission, under a former Conservative
minister, Lord Wakeham, was asked to report by the end of 1999, and it did so. The report,
A  House  for  the  Future,  made  132  proposals  on  recruitment  and  procedures.19 It
recommended  a  part-elected  House  of  approximately  550  members,  offering  three
options for the number to be elected (65, 87 or 195), most members of the Commission
preferring 87. The Leader of the House of Lords, Baroness Jay, announced on 7 March
2000 that the government was minded to accept “the broad outlines” of the report. This
stance was maintained by the government and in its  manifesto for the 2001 general
election it declared:
We are committed to completing House of Lords reform, including removal of the
remaining hereditary peers, to make it more representative and democratic, while
maintaining  the  House  of  Commons’  traditional  primacy.  We  have  given  our
support to the report and conclusions of the Wakeham Commission and will seek to
implement them in the most effective way possible.20
39 In  the  Queen’s  Speech  at  the  opening  of  the  Parliament,  the  government  promised
“following consultation” to introduce legislation to implement the second phase of House of
Lords reform. It thus looked as if the new Parliament would witness the completion of a
major transformation in the nature of the second chamber.
40 By 2001, the Labour government had thus achieved major change in the second chamber,
an  achievement  that  some  critics  had  not  thought  possible.  Others,  however,  called
attention to the limits of the change. The House remained an appointed rather than an
elected House. It was not in a position to challenge the supremacy of the elected House.
Even if stage two reform was implemented, it would still be a predominantly appointed
House. The government showed no appetite for a wholly elected House.
41 The limits of the reform were hardly surprising. Many, including the Royal Commission,
recognised that the existing House had a number of merits. It was a House of experienced
and often expert members who were able to subject legislation to informed scrutiny in a
way that the House of Commons could not. The scrutiny of European legislation by the
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House of Lords was widely recognised, not just in the UK but in the institutions of the
European Union, as being authoritative and of high quality. The House added value to the
political  process  and  there  was  a  reluctance  to  lose  that  value.  Of  the  submissions
received by the Royal Commission, those who were most informed about the work of the
House were more likely than others who made submissions to support the retention of
the House as an appointed chamber. There was also the recognition that the House of
Commons (or, as some critics pointed out, primarily that part of the House of Commons
which formed the government) was not going to be too keen on having an elected second
chamber that would thus be in a position to challenge its own supremacy. The House of
Commons was not expected to be willing to move from being the elected chamber to
being one of two elected chambers.
42 At the start of the new Parliament in 2001, there was thus little prospect of anything
more than a part-elected chamber being created. Indeed, some critics doubted if even a
part-elected chamber would be achieved. The government had committed itself to
legislation but only after “further consultation”. It was known that the parties would not
necessarily agree on what form the consultation should take. A joint committee had not
been appointed at the end of the previous Parliament because of disagreement as to what
it should do. There was the belief on the part of some observers that “further consultation”
was a euphemism for taking things slowly or even making no progress at all. There was
the prospect of a part-elected House, but that appeared to be the most that reformers
could hope for, and even that was not certain.
 
Conclusion
43 The British Parliament has thus seen changes to both Houses since the election of  a
Labour government in 1997. The institution looks very different to that which existed in
1997  and  it  operates  in  a  notably  changed  constitutional  framework.  However,  the
changes in many respects are as remarkable for how far they have failed to go as for how
far they have actually gone. Reform of the House of Commons has fallen far short of what
reformers have advocated. It has seen little, if any, increase in its viscosity. The stream
has got stronger as its capacity to limit it has changed very little. Reform of the House of
Lords has not gone as far as some reformers wished, though admittedly much further
than some Conservatives want.  Further change to the both Houses is on the political
agenda. Some of these changes may be realised but there are countervailing forces at
work that may well ensure that completion of a reform agenda is partial rather than full.
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ABSTRACTS
The key concept of any study of the role of Parliament focuses on the extent to which it is able to
influence  and  constrain  the  Executive.  Reforming  Parliament  should  seek  to  strengthen its
capacity to do so. A clear distinction ought to be drawn between external and internal reforms of
the Parliamentary system. While the former strive to achieve the desired goal through changes
in the constitutional  framework –  e.g.  the reform of  the House of  Lords  –  the latter  aim to
improve the working of existing structures. As regards the House of Commons, it is questionable
whether the internal reforms introduced by the Blair government actually met the demands of
the advocates of the strengthening of Parliament. Indeed one may even argue that the lower
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House has become more marginalised while the uncompleted reform of the House of Lords has
failed to clarify the future role of the second chamber.
L’analyse de la capacité du Parlement à peser sur le pouvoir de décision de l’exécutif  est  au
centre de toute étude du dispositif  institutionnel.  La réforme du fonctionnement du système
parlementaire doit avoir pour objectif le renforcement de ce rôle d’influenceur. Selon les cas, les
réformes  seront  d’origine  externe  ou  à  caractère  interne.  Les  premières  procèdent  d’une
modification constitutionnelle ; tel est le cas notamment de la réforme de la Chambre des Lords.
Les secondes visent à améliorer la qualité du travail parlementaire. S’agissant de la Chambre des
Communes,  on  se  demandera  si  les  réformes  internes  mises  en  œuvre  par  le  précédent
gouvernement  Blair  ont  répondu à  l’attente  des  partisans  du  renforcement  des  pouvoirs  du
Parlement. On peut, du reste, aller jusqu’à affirmer que la Chambre Basse connaît aujourd’hui
une marginalisation plus marquée. Quant à la Chambre Haute, seul l’achèvement de la réforme
permettra d’en clarifier le rôle.
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